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针对当前关于高管薪酬激励是否有效的争议热点,引入CEO特质的差异影响,探析货币薪酬对CEO特质的敏感性以及CEO特质在货币薪酬和过度投资关系中的调节效应。以2009—2013年沪深主板A股上市公司为样本,实证结果发现:总体上CEO特质和货币薪酬存在关联,表现在年龄、学历和任期与货币薪酬正相关,而性别与薪酬无显著性关系;薪酬激励能够抑制过度投资,CEO学历通过知识效应加强了薪酬对过度投资的抑制作用,但年龄和任期的代理效应弱化了薪酬对过度投资的抑制作用,并发现国有公司和两职合一公司薪酬激励对抑制过度投资的无效性。从过度投资角度揭示了CEO特质对薪酬激励效应的作用机制,为合理制定薪酬合约和高管聘任等提供借鉴。
In view of the current controversial hot spot on whether executive compensation incentives are effective, the paper introduces the difference effect of CEO traits, probes into the sensitivity of monetary compensation to CEO traits and the regulatory effect of CEO traits in the relationship between monetary compensation and overinvestment. Based on the 2009-2013 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the empirical results show that there is an overall correlation between CEO traits and money remuneration, which is related to age, education background and tenure, but not to gender and remuneration ; Salary incentive can restrain overinvestment, CEO education enhances the inhibitory effect of salary on overinvestment through knowledge effect, but agency effect of age and term weakens the inhibitory effect of salary on overinvestment, and finds that state-owned company and two-employee one company Incentives to suppress overinvestment ineffectiveness. From the perspective of over-investment, it reveals the mechanism of CEO traits on the compensation incentive effect, and provides reference for the rational formulation of compensation contracts and appointment of senior executives.