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可追溯性作为一种不断发展的信息披露和质量安全控制方法,通过降低供应链中各环节企业之间的信息不对称性,进而达到保证最终产品质量的目的。本文探究了多个同质供应商和一个制造商组成的消费类电子产品供应链结构中,在供应链中企业存在双边道德风险情况下,可追溯性对最优成本分担合同的设计,及供应商和制造商的最优生产行为的作用机制。研究发现,可追溯性作为一种信息披露手段,增加供应链中任一环节的可追溯性,不仅会提升本环节企业的生产努力水平,也会对其他环节企业的生产决策产生正面影响。同时,可追溯性作为一种质量控制手段,降低了质量分担合同中制造商要求供应商分担的补偿成本,在保证产品质量的基础上维系了供应链企业间的合作关系,降低了信息不对称下的道德风险发生的可能性。
As an evolving information disclosure and quality and safety control method, traceability can achieve the purpose of guaranteeing the quality of the final product by reducing the information asymmetry between enterprises in all aspects of the supply chain. This paper explores the structure of supply chain of consumer electronic products composed of multiple homogeneous suppliers and one manufacturer. In the case of bilateral moral hazard in the supply chain, the design of the contract of optimal cost sharing by traceability and the supply The mechanism of action of optimal producer behavior for manufacturers and manufacturers. The study found that traceability as an information disclosure means to increase the traceability of any part of the supply chain will not only enhance the level of production efforts of enterprises in this sector, but also have a positive impact on production decisions of other sectors. At the same time, traceability, as a quality control measure, reduces the cost of compensation required by the manufacturers in the quality sharing contract, and maintains the cooperation among the supply chain enterprises on the basis of ensuring the quality of the products, reducing the information asymmetry Under the moral hazard possibility.