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发展绿色经济,既是中国经济社会可持续发展的必然选择,也是应对未来可能日益增多的国际环境问题矛盾的迫切要求。政府促进绿色经济政策工具可分为管制性和经济引导性两类。管制性政策的弹性小,有效成本巨大,而经济引导性能够促进关联者自发行动,是主要考虑对象。目前我国绿色经济政策的参数多为主观判断,缺乏定量化手段。以Stackelberg模型作为理论基础来构建博弈模型,可以分析绿色产业链条的责任者和辅助者与政府政策之间的互动,得出最优征罚率与最优补贴率,从而为制定促进绿色经济发展的最优经济引导性政策提供建议。
Developing a green economy is both an inevitable choice for China’s sustainable economic and social development and an urgent response to the possible contradictions in international environmental issues that may be increasing in the future. Government tools to promote green economy policies can be divided into two categories of regulatory and economic guidance. Regulatory policy flexibility is small, the effective cost is huge, and economic guidance can promote the spontaneous actions of related parties, which is the main consideration. At present, the parameters of China’s green economy policy are mostly subjective judgments, lacking of quantitative means. Stackelberg model as a theoretical basis to build a game model can analyze the interaction between the green industry chain of the responsible and supporting persons and government policies to arrive at the optimal penalty rate and the optimal subsidy rate for the development of green economy development The best economic guidance policy to provide advice.