自企业所有权与控制权相分离的观点的提出,代理问题开始进入研究者的视野。相关激励设施的设计以及实施,旨在能够使得企业实现其剩余索取权以及控制权的匹配,进而使企业管理者与股东利益趋于一致、降低代理成本。最典型的机制就是允许企业管理层拥有一定的剩余索取权,便产生了公司业绩与高层管理者薪酬的相关性问题。随着现代企业制度在中国企业中的逐步建立和完善,有关高管薪酬与企业绩效之间的相关性问题研究也逐渐丰富。然而,大量的实证研究结果与理论预测并不一致。 From the perspective of the separation of ownership and control of the enterprise, the agency problem began to enter the researcher’s field of vision. The design and implementation of related incentive facilities are designed to enable enterprises to match their residual claims and their control rights so as to bring the interests of managers and shareholders in line with each other and reduce agency costs. The most typical mechanism is to allow the management to have a certain amount of residual claim, which results in the correlation between corporate performance and top management compensation. With the gradual establishment and perfection of modern enterprise system in Chinese enterprises, the research on the correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance has gradually been enriched. However, a large number of empirical findings are not consistent with theoretical predictions.