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专名问题在语言哲学和逻辑哲学研究中一直处在重要地位。专名理论通常分为摹状词理论和严格指示词理论,二者的最主要分歧在于确定专名的指称对象的方式不同。名称的描述理论认为专名在确定指称时需要通过借助摹状词,传统描述理论哲学家也意识到确定名称所借助的摹状词因人而异,这样可能会造成指称失败。而以克里普克为代表的直接指称理论认为专名是严格的指示词,描述性的反事实状况不能造成专名指称的不同。专名具有严格性。与此相伴而来的另一个问题是个体的跨界同一性问题。这两个问题的探讨都离不开对可能世界理论的理解。本文从可能世界这一概念出发,深入探讨专名的严格性问题,并从逻辑角度阐述专名严格性的必要性,最后阐述专名的严格性与个体跨界同一性问题密切相关,对专名作严格性的理解可以直接解释个体跨界同一性问题。
The problem of proper names has always been an important issue in the study of linguistic philosophy and philosophical philosophy. The theory of proper names is usually divided into the theory of descriptions and the theory of strict instructions. The main difference between the two is that there are different ways to determine the names of the proper names. The descriptive theory of the name suggests that the proper name needs to pass through the descriptive word, while the traditional descriptive philosopher of the description also realizes that the descriptive word on which the name is determined varies from person to person, which may cause the allegation to fail. The direct reference theory represented by Kripke regards the proper name as a strict indicator and the descriptive anti-factual situation can not cause the difference of the proper name. Name is strict. Another problem that accompanies this is the issue of individual cross-border identities. Both of these issues are inseparable from the understanding of the possible world theory. Based on the concept of the possible world, this article explores the strictness of the proper names in detail and elaborates the necessity of strictness of the proper names from the logic point of view. Finally, the strictness of the proper names is closely related to the issue of individual cross-border identities. The rigorous understanding of masterpieces can directly explain the issue of individual cross-border identities.