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本文以我国2009-2011年在创业板首次公开上市的281家公司为样本,研究风险投资的介入是否对创业企业的高管薪酬产生影响。结果发现:与无风险投资参与的公司相比,有风险投资参与的公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高;不同特征的风险投资公司对创业企业高管薪酬有着不同的影响,持股时间长、持股比例高、非国有背景与单一投资的风险投资支持的创业企业,其公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性高。这表明,风险投资的介入缓解了委托代理问题,提高了公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性,改善了我国创业企业的公司治理水平。
Based on the sample of 281 initial public listed companies in China from 2009 to 2011, this paper investigates whether the involvement of venture capital will affect executive compensation of start-ups. The results show that: compared with the companies without risky investment, the companies with venture capital are more sensitive to executive compensation performance; venture capital firms with different characteristics have different impacts on executive compensation of venture enterprises, holding shares for a long time, Venture companies with high shareholdings, non-state-owned backgrounds and single-venture venture capital investments are highly sensitive to executive pay performance. This shows that the involvement of venture capital has alleviated the principal-agent problem, raised the sensitivity of executive pay performance and improved the level of corporate governance in China’s start-ups.