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从国有企业如何构建学习型组织的视角出发,通过构建离散型和连续型两种博弈行为模型,分析国有企业与员工之间的博弈行为。研究发现,连续型博弈行为的收益共享策略能解决离散型博弈行为收益共享策略所面临的“囚徒困境”。在古诺博弈和斯塔克尔伯格博弈两种外部环境下,分别将变动分配和固定分配作为收益共享原则,建立国有企业内部博弈模型,及时关注企业与员工之间博弈行为的互动并改变博弈策略,保障企业有效运行。最后,以同仁堂集团为实例,验证国有企业内部博弈行为模型的有效性。
From the perspective of state-owned enterprises how to construct a learning organization, this paper analyzes the game behavior between state-owned enterprises and employees by constructing two game behavior models, discrete and continuous. The study found that the revenue sharing strategy of continuous game behavior can solve the “Prisoners Dilemma” faced by the strategy of revenue sharing in discrete game. Under the two Cournot games and Starkerberg games, changing distribution and fixed distribution respectively as the principle of revenue sharing, establishing the internal game model of state-owned enterprises, keeping an eye on the interaction and changing of the game behavior between enterprises and employees Game strategy to ensure the effective operation of enterprises. Finally, the example of Tong Ren Tang Group is used to verify the validity of the game behavior model in state-owned enterprises.