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法律解释学自产生之日起,就一直受到种种质疑(如它可能导致法治的消解),而法律解释学界迄今似乎并未有力地回应这些质疑。之所以造成这种局面,主要是因为法律解释学本身还没能清楚地解决如下一些问题:它的理论依据似乎游移于传统解释学与哲学解释学之间;它对“解释”的解释并不清晰,因为当前的法律解释学似乎没能意识到解释其实同时是方法、存在并且还具有哲学研究的属性;它一定程度上无视法律解释学与法律解释之间的互渗、纠缠,这种无视反过来又模糊了它对自身的定位;等等。可以说,只有当法律解释学厘清了上述问题,才可能较好地回应当前的诸种质疑,进而证立其自身的必要性和正当性。
Legal hermeneutics has been questioned since its inception (as it may lead to the dissolution of the rule of law), and so far the legal interpretation profession has not responded strongly to these questions. The reason for this situation is mainly because the legal hermeneutics itself has not been able to clearly solve the following problems: its theoretical basis seems to have shifted between traditional hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics; its interpretation of “interpretation ” It is not clear that the current legal hermeneutics seems unable to realize that the interpretation is actually a method at the same time. It exists and possesses the properties of philosophical research. It ignores to some extent the mutual infiltration and entanglement between legal hermeneutics and legal interpretation Ignoring it in turn obscures its position on itself; and so on. It can be said that only when the legal interpretation of the above problems are clarified, it may be better to respond to the current various questions, and thus establish its own necessity and legitimacy.