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以往有关绿色供应链激励机制的研究主要是围绕制造商为核心企业展开.而2014年12月颁布的《企业绿色采购指南(试行)》强调了采购商(或零售商)在绿色供应链当中所起的作用.以零售商(而不是供应商)作为核心企业,建立供应商-零售商绿色供应链博弈模型,用以研究零售商的激励制度设计以及绿色产品需求如何影响绿色供应链.分别求解供应商不进行绿色工艺研发、供应商单独进行绿色工艺研发的供应链均衡解,并且设计了转移支付激励机制.研究表明:1)供应商和零售商不一定都有激励提高产品绿色度,但在特定条件下,他们都有动力提高产品绿色度;2)如果供应商和零售商都有动力提高产品绿色度,那么供应商主导型的绿色供应链比零售商主导型的供应链在为整个供应链创造利润方面更佳;3)零售商主导型的绿色供应链可找到最优转移支付比例使得供应链整体利润最大化,且转移支付激励手段有效.
In the past, the research on the incentive mechanism of green supply chain mainly focused on manufacturers as the core business.The “Green Procurement Guide for Enterprises (Trial)” promulgated in December 2014 emphasizes that buyers (or retailers) in the green supply chain The role of retailer (rather than supplier) as a core enterprise is to establish a supplier-retailer green supply chain game model to study the retailer’s incentive system design and how green product demand affects the green supply chain. Suppliers do not conduct research and development of green technology, and suppliers independently balance supply chain solutions for green technology research and development, and design a transfer payment incentive mechanism.The research shows that: 1) Suppliers and retailers do not necessarily have the incentive to improve the green degree of products, Under certain conditions, they have the motivation to improve the greenness of their products. 2) If both suppliers and retailers are motivated to increase the greenness of their products, the supplier-led green supply chain is more competitive than the retailer-led supply chain for the entire supply 3) the retailer-led green supply chain can find the optimal proportion of transfer payments so that the overall supply chain benefits Maximize effective incentives and transfer payments.