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与我国15年来经济改革的成果相比,国有企业的改革可以说是举步维艰、进展缓慢。面对这种状况,人们普通认识到了既有的改革措施(如经营承包制)的局限性,在股份制的导入上取得了共识。然而,不可否认,在关于如何进行股份制改革方面还众说纷纭,意见不一。其中有的人认为,解决国有企业负盈不负亏问题的一个可行之路是彻底实行国家所有下的所有权与经营权的分离,给企业自主经营权。这一认识的问题在于它仅仅把眼光放到了放权让利的激励效果,而忽视了现行国有财产管理制度固有的制度缺陷。也就是说,这种看法只看到了现代企业制度中的两权分离的表象效果,而没有注意到导致这一效果的必要条件和深层原因。
Compared with the achievements of China’s economic reform over the past 15 years, the reform of state-owned enterprises can be said to be difficult and slow. Faced with this situation, people generally recognize the limitations of existing reform measures (such as operating contracting system) and have reached a consensus on the introduction of joint stock system. However, it is undeniable that there are still different views on how to implement the shareholding system reform and there are different opinions. Some of them believe that a feasible way to solve the issue of whether state-owned enterprises are responsible for losses or losses is to thoroughly implement the separation of ownership and management rights owned by the state and give enterprises the right to operate independently. The problem with this understanding is that it merely sets its sights on the incentive effect of decentralization and disregard for profits, while ignoring the inherent institutional deficiencies in the current state-owned property management system. In other words, this view only sees the effect of the separation of the two powers in the modern enterprise system, and fails to notice the necessary conditions and in-depth reasons leading to this effect.