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对合成生物学的讨论更多是从技术及其伦理应用后果来展开,但是需要澄清其讨论的本体论承诺。对辛西娅现象展开伦理讨论的本体论的承诺是:辛西娅作为合成的他者存在。缺失这一本体论的承诺,伦理讨论将失去根基。传统现象学认为,对他者存在的把握要借助第二性、特殊的相似性统觉。但是面对辛西娅,现象学的原则失去了效力。作为他者的辛西娅是基于理性相似性统觉来把握的,而理性相似性统觉建立在还原主义之上。如此,作为他者的辛西娅被确立起来。尽管我们基于理性相似性确定了辛西娅的存在,但是无法构建起精神性因素。所以,辛西娅依然是一个等待被给予灵魂的他者。
The discussion of synthetic biology is more based on the technical and ethical implications of the application, but needs to be clarified on the ontological promise of its discussion. The ontology promise of an ethical discussion of the Cynthia phenomenon is that Cynthia exists as a synthetic other. Without this ontological commitment, ethical discourse will lose ground. The traditional phenomenology holds that the existence of the other should be based on the second nature and the special similarity. But in the face of Cynthia, the principle of phenomenology lost its effectiveness. As the other’s Cynthia is based on the sense of rational similarity to grasp, and the sense of rational similarity based on the reductionism. Thus, Cynthia as the other is established. Although we determined the existence of Cynthia based on the rational similarity, we can not construct spiritual factors. So, Cynthia is still a waiting for the soul to be given to the other.