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对1936—1937年间的蒋介石而言,如何综合处理对日对苏关系及其中“抗日”与“防共”这一组复合性的课题,是一个两难抉择。基于“倭患急,俄患缓;俄患大,倭患小”的根本认识,他在这一阶段总体上仍以促使日苏两大强邻相互牵制为目标,故一边为合作抗日而推进与苏联、中共的谈判,一边则在对日外交上以日方最重视的防共问题为筹码,谋求缓和中日关系。西安事变后,蒋虽在抵抗日本侵略方面日趋坚定,但在联苏问题上依然处在纠结之中。最后,在日苏两国对华姿态日趋相反的客观形势下,蒋才为以缓制急而被迫发动对日抗战。在研究蒋介石的这一心路历程时,必须重视其中的多元性、变动性与反复性。
For Chiang Kai-shek from 1936 to 1937, it was a dilemma for how to comprehensively handle the issue of the compound relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and the “anti-Japanese” and “anti-Communist” issues among them. Based on the fundamental understanding of “Japanese suffering from acute, Russian suffering from slow; Russia suffering from large, Japanese suffering from small ”, he is still at this stage to promote the two major strong neighbors Japan and the Soviet Union as the goal of mutual restraint, it is for the cooperation of anti-Japanese While pushing forward the negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, they sought to ease the Sino-Japanese relations by using the most important anti-Communist issue of Japan as a bargaining chip in their diplomatic ties with Japan. After the Xi’an Incident, Jiang was steadfastly steadfast in resisting Japanese aggression but was still entangled in the issue of the Soviet Union-Soviet Union. Finally, under the objective situation in which the postures of Japan and the Soviet Union toward China are becoming increasingly opposite, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to launch a war of resistance against Japan on a temporary basis. In studying this mentality of Chiang Kai-shek, we must attach importance to its diversity, change and repetition.