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Since 2010, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereafter SASAC) started the full implementation of the EVA evaluation system in central enterprises. Our research finds out that the central enterprises have obvious acted to meet the EVA assessment, that is, executives intentionally regulate major EVA adjustments to gain a higher EVA performance. We also find that the factor of shareholding rate of executives may in some extent weaken the effect of the EVA assessment and there shows a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relation between shareholding rate and each adjustment indicator.
Since 2010, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereafter SASAC) started the full implementation of the EVA evaluation system in central enterprises. Our research finds out that the central enterprises have obvious acted to meet the EVA assessment, that is, executives intentionally regulate major EVA adjustments to gain a higher EVA performance. We also find that the factor of shareholding rate of executives may in some extent weaken the effect of the EVA assessment and there shows a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relation between shareholding rate and each adjustment indicator