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本文构建了由制造商作为Stackelberg博弈领导者和零售商作为跟随者的分散式决策闭环供应链模型,研究了在产品最大市场需求规模受到突发事件干扰的情况下,闭环供应链各成员的应急决策问题。研究表明:相比稳定环境下的最优决策,当需求扰动发生后零售商应按产品最大市场需求规模发生扰动的方向调整产品的单位零售价格,而产品的订货量和废旧品的回收率在一定的鲁棒区间内可以保持不变,当仅当市场需求扰动的程度突破一定阀值时,才应按最大市场需求规模发生扰动的方向对它们进行相应地调整;与此同时,制造商可保持废旧品的单位转移价格一直不变,而仅需按照最大市场需求规模发生扰动的方向对单位批发价格进行相应地调整。
This paper constructs a decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain model with manufacturers as the Stackelberg game leader and retailers as followers. This paper studies the emergency response of members of the closed-loop supply chain under the condition that the demand scale of the largest market is interrupted by emergencies. Decision problems. The results show that compared with the optimal decision under stable environment, when the disturbance of demand occurs, the retailer should adjust the unit retail price of the product in the direction of the disturbance caused by the size of the product’s largest market demand, while the product ordering quantity and the recovery rate of the waste product A certain range of robustness can remain unchanged. When the degree of disturbance in market demand breaks through a certain threshold, they should be adjusted according to the direction of the disturbance in the scale of the largest market demand. At the same time, The unit price of the scrapped products shall remain the same, but only the wholesale price of the unit shall be adjusted accordingly in the direction of the disturbance of the scale of the largest market demand.