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针对中央政府对地方政府激励不足使得农村水利建设财政投入不足,从而导致农村水利基础设施供给出现困境的问题,基于委托代理理论,分别建立了以产出和以投入为标的进行激励的委托—代理模型,并对两种不同激励模式的激励效果进行对比。结果表明,在农村水利基础设施供给中,对产出能力相对较低的产业或部门,中央政府应采取按地方政府投入量进行激励的模式可达到更好的效果,而对产出能力相对较高的产业和部门,中央政府应采取按产出进行激励的模式可达到更好的效果。
In response to the insufficient incentive of the central government to the local government, the insufficient investment in rural water conservancy construction leads to the predicament of the supply of rural water conservancy infrastructure. Based on the principal-agent theory, the commission-agent Model, and compared the incentive effects of two different incentive modes. The results show that in the supply of rural water conservancy infrastructure, for the industries or sectors with relatively lower output capacity, the central government should adopt the mode of incentive according to the amount of local government investment to achieve better results, while the output capacity is relatively High industries and sectors, the central government should take the model of incentive-based output can achieve better results.