本文在简单介绍股票期权激励的相关概念后,应用信息经济学的委托—代理理论模型,分析了在股票期权激励和传统激励方式中公司经营者的努力程度,并对激励效果进行了比较静态分析,最后得出的结论是:由于公司经营者的努力程度对公司盈利的影响比对股票价格的影响更直接,在其他条件相同时,股票期权的激励效果不如传统激励方式。 After introducing the relative concepts of stock option incentive, this paper applies the principal-agent theory model of information economics to analyze the effort of the managers in stock option incentive and traditional incentive methods, and makes a comparative static analysis of the incentive effects Finally, the conclusion is drawn that the incentive of stock option is not as effective as the traditional incentive method when the other conditions are the same because the influence of company manager’s effort on the company’s profit is more direct than the impact on the stock price.