论文部分内容阅读
在大小股东冲突框架下,基于大股东对控制权私利可持续性偏好,构建大股东获取控制权私利行为模型,研究了潜在风险对大股东获取控制权私利行为的影响及对公司价值的影响,对部分控制权私利的合理性进行了探讨。而后,利用研究结论给出一个控制权私利悖论的解释。研究表明:(1)因潜在风险(成本)的存在,大股东会谋取位于控制权私利容忍区间内的控制权私利,达到既能让自己的控制权成本得到补偿,又能维持收益的可持续性目的。(2)获取适当控制权私利对大股东具有激励作用,能够保证中小股东利益和公司价值不受到损失。(3)超额控制权私利具有侵害性质,会导致中小股东利益和公司价值受损,它才是控制与治理的对象。最后文章在理论分析的基础上给出了一些结论和建议。
In the framework of the conflict between large and small shareholders, based on the preference of majority shareholders for the self-control of private interests, the author constructs a private-owned behavior model of controlling shareholders and investigates the influence of potential risks on the private interests of controlling shareholders and the impact on corporate value. The reasonableness of the self-interest of partial control was discussed. Then, the conclusion of the study is used to explain the paradox of private interest in control. The research shows that: (1) Due to the potential risk (cost), the majority shareholder will seek the private benefit of control within the private tolerance of control, so as to not only make the cost of control right to be compensated, but also maintain the profitability Sexual purpose. (2) Gaining proper control of private interests has incentives for major shareholders to ensure that the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values are not compromised. (3) The self-interest of excess control has the nature of infringement, which will result in the loss of the interests of minority shareholders and the value of the company. It is the object of control and governance. The last article gives some conclusions and suggestions on the basis of theoretical analysis.