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进口促进、出口限制的反向贸易政策成为当今贸易摩擦的新起因。中美两国在稀有资源贸易中的摩擦即是最好的例证。战略性贸易利益不仅包括取得规模经济、垄断利润等传统贸易利益,还包括产业链控制力、资源可持续性利用、国家经济安全等新型贸易利益。本文在三国局部均衡框架下,建立多阶段博弈模型,通过对进口促进与出口限制政策共存、仅存进口促进政策两种不同战略性贸易政策实施情形下国家福利变化的对比,分析新型战略性贸易利益的来源,并解释不同国家倾向采取不同战略性贸易政策以及贸易摩擦产生的原因。通过数据模拟分析,又进一步验证得到资源丰富国家倾向于实施出口限制的贸易政策、资源稀缺国家倾向于实施进口促进和抵制出口限制政策的贸易政策的结论。通过对中国稀土贸易争端的案例分析表明博弈模型对现实贸易摩擦的发生具有一定的解释能力。上述结论是对现有战略性贸易政策以及国际贸易摩擦理论研究的进一步扩展。
The counter-trade policy of import promotion and export restriction has become a new cause of trade friction today. The friction between China and the United States in the trade of rare resources is the best example. Strategic trade interests include not only obtaining traditional trade benefits such as economies of scale and monopoly profits, but also new trade interests such as control over the industrial chain, sustainable use of resources and national economic security. Under the framework of the partial equilibrium of the three countries, a multi-stage game model is established. By comparing the changes in state welfare under the implementation of two different kinds of strategic trade policies, including import promotion and export restriction policies, The source of interest, and explains why different countries tend to adopt different strategic trade policies and trade frictions. Through data simulation analysis, we further verify the trade policy that resource-rich countries tend to impose export restrictions, while resource-scarce countries tend to implement the conclusion of trade policies on import promotion and boycott of export restrictions. Through the case analysis of rare earth trade disputes in China, the game model shows that the game model can explain the real trade friction. The above conclusion is a further expansion of the research on the existing strategic trade policy and the theory of international trade friction.