针对由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的销售单一季节性产品的双渠道供应链,本文研究了当两个渠道都面临随机需求且渠道间存在搭便车行为时,供应链的最优决策问题以及协调机制.研究表明,供应链双方构成超模博弈,纳什均衡解存在且唯一.随着搭便车顾客比例的增加,双方会降低售价和安全库存.数值实验结果显示,搭便车行为会损害零售商利益但在特定情况下会有利于制造商.两部定价合同和限制最低售价的收益共享合同均能实现供应链协调.在前者中,零售商可以利用补偿值来激励制造商涨价以减少搭便车顾客数;在后者中,零售商可以得到更低的批发价. For a dual-channel supply chain that consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer that sells a single seasonal product, this paper studies the optimal decision-making of the supply chain when both channels face stochastic demand and free-riding behavior exists among the channels, and Coordination mechanism.Studies show that the supply chain both constitute the supermode game and the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.With the increase of the proportion of pick-up customers, the two sides will lower the selling price and the safety stock.The numerical experiments show that the free-riding behavior will damage the retail The benefits of the firm, however, are in the particular case of favor to the manufacturer. Two supply contracts are available for both the price contract and the revenue sharing contract that limits the minimum price, in which the retailer can use the compensation value to motivate the producer price increase Reduce the number of pick-up customers; in the latter, retailers can get a lower wholesale price.