我国目前各地区的税收竞争愈演愈烈,本文对区域间税收竞争的成因、运行机理进行分析后,通过建立一个博弈模型说明各地政府参与税收竞争有其合理的内在激励,提出在我国投资需求旺盛的现阶段,适度的税收竞争是有积极意义的,可使中央、地方、投资者达到“三赢”,但过度的税收竞争将导致经济的无谓损失。 After the analysis of the causes and operating mechanism of the regional tax competition in our country, we establish a game model to show that all local governments have their own reasonable internal incentive to participate in the tax competition, and put forward that the investment demand in our country is strong now Stage, moderate tax competition is positive, allowing the central government, local governments and investors to achieve “three wins”, but excessive tax competition will lead to unnecessary deadweight losses.