运用不完全信息动态博弈的有关理论,建立了基于随机查勘策略的夸大损失索赔欺诈博弈模型,给出了保险双方的博弈策略选择及其可能达到的均衡,分析了满足保险人零期望利润约束的保险费率公式.研究表明,博弈模型存在某种形式的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,而且道德风险的存在会使保险单价格上升.最后,论证了保险标的损失额度为离散随机变量时夸大损失索赔欺诈博弈问题解的形式. By using the theory of incomplete information dynamic game, a game model of exaggerated loss claim fraud based on stochastic investigation strategy is established. The game strategy of both parties and its possible equilibrium are given. The research shows that there exists some kind of refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game model and the existence of moral hazard will lead to the increase of the price of insurance policy.Finally, the paper argues that when the amount of loss of insurance subject to discrete random variable is exaggerated loss claim Fraud game problem solution form.