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会计准则的不断变迁导致会计—税收差异逐步扩大,这一现象的经济后果引起了学术界的广泛关注。本文从委托代理框架出发,考察了会计—税收差异对薪酬契约的影响。基于我国上市公司2001—2010年的数据发现,上市公司正向的会计—税收差异和负向的会计—税收差异越大,会计盈余与高管薪酬的敏感性越低,且高管薪酬的“粘性”程度越大。本文的结论对新近关于会计—税收差异经济后果的学术文献进行了有效的补充,也为深化对高管薪酬契约的认识提供了重要启示。
The ever-changing accounting standards have led to the gradual widening of accounting-tax differences. The economic consequences of this phenomenon have aroused widespread concern in the academic community. This article starts from the principal-agent framework and examines the impact of accounting-tax differences on the compensation contract. Based on the data of China’s listed companies from 2001 to 2010, it is found that the greater the accounting-tax difference and the negative accounting-tax difference of listed companies, the lower the sensitivity of accounting earnings and executive compensation, and the higher of executive compensation. The greater the degree of “stickiness”. The conclusions of this paper effectively complement the recent academic literature on the economic consequences of accounting-tax differences and provide important insights for deepening the understanding of executive compensation contracts.